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Abstract 
 
The aim of this work is to analyze the role played by both foreign and indigenous innovation on 
energy intensity as well as the possible interactions between them across 30 Chinese regions. In 
addition, we disaggregate non-state investment into the different types of corporate ownership that 
operate in China, controlling for other relevant factors such as energy price and the share of industry. 
We examine not only total energy intensity, but also coal, crude oil, natural gas, and electricity in 
order to provide a complete picture of the energy sector in this country. The empirical model is 
estimated by panel-corrected standard errors over the period 2006-2010. Our findings indicate that the 
process of technological change through both foreign and indigenous innovation has been an 
important mechanism to improve the use of energy resources. However, the interaction between 
foreign and indigenous innovations is modest. We also observe that non-state investment plays a key 
role in reducing energy intensity, although both the specific type of ownership and the source of 
energy also matter. A closer look at regional differences among the transmission grids in China 
reveals the importance of accounting for the structure of investment and its geographical location. 
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!1. Introduction "!
 #!
The fast process of industrialization has led the Chinese economy to consume a $!
significant amount of energy resources, thereby becoming one of the most important %!
consumers in the world today. However, the exceptional performance of this economy &!
and the rate at which energy is consumed are not free of cost. China is currently facing a '!
new scenario, where environmental pollution as well as problems in the supply of (!
energy are the core of a debate taking place in this country due to their expected )!
consequences on economic growth and the welfare of the population. Nonetheless, such *!
concerns are a relatively recent phenomenon. Indeed, the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-"+!
2010) was the first attempt to promote further reforms in the energy sector. This has ""!
been complemented by the 12th Five-Year Plan (FYP) (2011-2015), which set up "#!
several key targets to be reached by 2015, such as reducing pollutant emissions and "$!
energy consumption per unit of GDP by 17% and 16% respectively. Such a change in "%!
energy policies contrasts sharply with the previous period (before 2006) during which "&!
China paid little attention to achieving any environmental goals. This can be explained "'!
by the fact that energy-saving measures were seen by the Chinese government as a "(!
constraint on economic growth. However, relatively recent evidence shows that the ")!
Chinese economy can adopt energy-saving measures without interrupting the path "*!
toward economic growth (Herrerias et al., [1]). Thus, the key question to be answered #+!
is: What types of policies can be adopted by the government to improve energy #"!
efficiency and prevent global warming? This paper offers some new insights on this ##!
issue. #$!
In the energy economics literature, one of the strongest debates has been focused on #%!
energy intensity. This is a simple measure of the degree of efficiency in the use of #&!
energy resources, and it is used as a key indicator to design energy policies among the #'!
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developed and developing countries. Changes in energy efficiency can be attributed to #(!
technological progress and sectorial composition (Zhang, [2]; Fisher-Vanden et al., [3]; #)!
Fisher-Vanden et al., [4]; Liao et al., [5]; Ma and Stern, [6]; Herrerias et al., [12]). On #*!
the one hand, there is an agreement in the literature on the role played by the $+!
technological progress, however few works have disentangled the specific mechanisms $"!
through which it may operate. On the other hand, the effect of the composition effect $#!
would depend on the stage of economic development of different countries or regions $$!
e.g. moving away from heavy industry sectors towards light industry or vice versa and $%!
the shift from agriculture to industry. In this work, we focus on the technique effect, $&!
where we distinguish foreign and indigenous innovations as key factors to improve $'!
energy efficiency across Chinese regions. This distinction is important because $(!
economic policies adopted by the government can affect the economy directly or $)!
indirectly, modifying the incentives in the use of energy and stimulating the $*!
technological innovation. In the case of the Chinese economy, the open-door policy has %+!
increased the efficiency in the allocation of economic resources and enhanced the role %"!
played by trade and foreign direct investment as mechanisms for knowledge transfer. In %#!
addition, higher efforts towards the alleviation of pollution and improvement of energy %$!
efficiency have been made since 2006 for its relevance on the sustainability of %%!
economic growth. These policies influence the incentives to innovate through both %&!
indigenous and foreign technology.  %'!
Despite the relevance of foreign and indigenous innovations as sources of %(!
technological progress, their potential contribution to the advancement in energy %)!
efficiency, as well as the interactions that may exist between them, they have been %*!
ignored in the relevant literatures. In this paper, foreign technology is measured by &+!
foreign direct investment (FDI) and imports, while indigenous innovations are captured &"!
$!
!
by patents. On one hand, FDI has been found to be a suitable mechanism for technology &#!
transfer, which might affect productivity through spillover effects and also incorporates &$!
new technologies into the production process through the accumulation of physical &%!
capital. In addition, the presence of multinationals in the host economy may stimulate &&!
competition with local firms, encouraging them to use existing technologies more &'!
efficiently (Sjöholm and Lundin, [8]). In the international trade literatures, imports have &(!
been considered as an important channel for the international diffusion of knowledge &)!
due to the embodied technological progress in capital goods imports (Herrerias and &*!
Orts, [7]). On the other hand, indigenous innovation can emerge from the '+!
aforementioned competition effect and also from the implementation of innovation '"!
policies. They may stimulate the emergence of new discoveries or knowledge, thus '#!
improving efficiency and productivity. However, indigenous innovations could also be '$!
influenced by a country’s characteristics, such as the structure of ownership investment, '%!
as it may condition the effectiveness of incentives.  '&!
In the case of China, the transformation of the state sector and the emergence of new ''!
forms of investment ownership have been one of the fundamental keys to understand '(!
the process of China’s transition from a planned to a market economy. The share-')!
holding program initiated in the mid-1990s became the principal vehicle for '*!
implementing the ownership reform of the State-owned enterprises (SOEs) by the (+!
government (Jefferson and Su, [9]). This program was developed in response to the ("!
government’s concerns about the benefits that could bring about by the multinationals (#!
and has consequently triggered the emergence of new forms of investment as well as ($!
international joint-ventures between foreign and Chinese firms in China. The private (%!
sector now accounts for more than half of the total industrial output, compared with (&!
barely more than a quarter of it in 1998, and it operates much more efficiently than the ('!
%!
!
public sector (Dougherty et al., [10]). However, in spite of the rapid growth in foreign ((!
and domestic non-state investment activities, the share of state ownership in physical ()!
capital still predominates in the Chinese economy  (*!
The net effect of technological progress might depend on the interaction between )+!
foreign and indigenous innovations as well as on economic geography. First, foreign )"!
and indigenous technology in an economy might interact with each other to create some )#!
positive spillovers, e.g., local firms can learn from foreign enterprises. However, )$!
competition coming from the presence of foreign companies can also lead to a crowding )%!
out effect, since the less productive domestic firms may exit from the market, only the )&!
most productive being the ones that survive. Secondly, recent contributions from the )'!
economic geography literatures have revealed that the location of economic activity as )(!
well as its degree of concentration in the same industry also matter in the process of ))!
accumulation of knowledge. Such knowledge spillovers would be higher if the firms are )*!
located close to each other and are operating within the same industry and region. *+!
Therefore, when explaining the process of knowledge transfer coming from foreign and *"!
indigenous innovation in China, geography may play a key role due to the higher *#!
concentration of economic activities along the coastal area at the expense of Western *$!
regions. Thus, the outcomes from the interaction between foreign and indigenous *%!
innovation are, a priori, unclear.  *&!
In this context, the aim of this work is to provide new insights about three main *'!
questions. First, what is the differential role played by foreign and indigenous *(!
technology (as well as the interaction between them) on the diffusion of knowledge *)!
spillovers with an energy reducing effect? Second, since both location and geography **!
proximity matter in the process of accumulation of knowledge: Are there significant "++!
differences in energy efficiency across Chinese regions? Third, is the structure of "+"!
&!
!
corporate ownership a relevant factor to be considered in explaining the reduction in "+#!
energy intensity? We examine these issues for all sources of energy in the case of "+$!
Chinese regions over the period of 2006-2010. "+%!
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the "+&!
literature. Data and methodology are described in Section 3. Results are reported in "+'!
Section 4, while conclusions are drawn in Section 5. "+(!
2. Literature Review "+)!
Energy efficiency depends on both technological innovations and the accumulation "+*!
of physical capital. Technological innovations in an economy can come from outside of ""+!
the country through foreign direct investment and imports or from inside through """!
domestic innovation efforts. First, foreign direct investment plays a double role in the ""#!
process of energy efficiency improvement. On one hand, it is a potential source of ""$!
technology transfer and on the other hand it is investment from abroad, which ""%!
incorporates new technologies into the production process, both of which create ""&!
knowledge spillovers into the economy (Keller, [11]; Fisher-Vanden et al., [4]; ""'!
Herrerias et al., [12]; Huber, Error! Reference source not found.; Hübler, [13]; Hübler ""(!
and Keller, [14]; Kumar, [15]; Ma and Stern, [6]; Perkins and Neumayer, [16]; Sahu "")!
and Narayama, [17]). Imports can also affect energy efficiency by stimulating ""*!
competition between foreign and local firms (Amiti and Konigs, [1]; Herrerias and Orts, "#+!
[7],). Second, domestic innovation depends, however, on different factors such as the "#"!
technological capabilities of the home country, investment ownership, the role played "##!
by the government in gaining access to foreign technology, as well as local efforts to "#$!
promote the learning process coming from such technology, among other relevant "#%!
factors (Audretsch and Feldman, [29]). Thus, countries, especially the developing ones, "#&!
also have to rely on indigenous innovation efforts to promote economic development "#'!
'!
!
(Fu and Gong, [20]). This capability for domestic innovation seems to play a central "#(!
role in mastering new technologies and adapting them to local conditions (Lall, [21]).1 "#)!
In both sources of technology – foreign and indigenous – the interaction between them "#*!
and their geographical distribution are relevant factors that should be considered in "$+!
improving energy efficiency.  "$"!
On the one hand, there are theoretical arguments and empirical evidences have "$#!
proved that indigenous and foreign innovation efforts can be complementary (Fu et al., "$$!
[41]). Such an effect could arise if, for instance, the presence of a multinational can "$%!
bring knowledge transfer into local firms, which may stimulate both innovation activity "$&!
and absorptive capacity (Li, [22]; Fisher-Vanden et al., [4]). In addition, information "$'!
provided by local firms can be very useful as they are more familiar with the local "$(!
market and the potential of foreign technology (Zhou and Xin, [23]). Positive "$)!
interactions between foreign and local firms were found by Girma et al. [24], who "$*!
showed that multinationals played a significant role in restructuring Chinese state-"%+!
owned enterprises by introducing new technology and better managerial skills through "%"!
joint-ventures. While Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare [25] argued that firms with foreign "%#!
participation in China are of higher level of technology competence. In the case of "%$!
energy sector, Fu and Zhang [26] illustrated that the simultaneous adoption of both "%%!
technology transfer and indigenous innovation would be suitable for the technological "%&!
progress and the development of green technology sectors in developing countries. "%'!
More recently, however, Sjöholm and Lundin [8] did not find any positive impact of "%(!
FDI on R&D in domestically-owned firms, and Perkins and Neumayer [16] argued that "%)!
increased competitive pressures from multinationals may reduce the profitability of "%*!
domestic firms and delay their investments in more energy-efficient plants. Moreover, "&+!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 In China, there has been a change in the Chinese government’s approach with greater emphasis on 
indigenous technology development and a more hesitant approach toward FDI (see Sjöholm and Lundin, 
[8]). 
(!
!
those domestic firms that are unable to compete on the basis of technology leadership, "&"!
they might pursue a cost minimization strategy and devote little resource in "&#!
environment-efficient designs. "&$!
In this paper, we argue that the mixed evidence about the interaction between foreign "&%!
and indigenous innovation can be explained by two factors. First, spillovers associated "&&!
with both foreign transactions and indigenous innovation capabilities might be "&'!
geographically localized (Jaffe et al., [27]). Second, empirical evidence indicates that "&(!
innovation capabilities seem to vary by type of ownership.! In the case of China, Wang "&)!
and Lin [28] recently emphasized the need to account for both regional factors and firm-"&*!
level characteristics in order to analyze the dynamics of innovation. "'+!
On the other hand, the literature on knowledge spillovers and the geography of "'"!
innovation highlights the fact that geography matters in transmitting knowledge "'#!
(Audretsch and Feldman, [29]). Proximity enhances the ability of firms to exchange "'$!
ideas thereby allowing them to increase the accumulation of knowledge, and reducing "'%!
the uncertainty in the market where they operate. For these firms, being spatially "'&!
concentrated in areas where resources are abundant reduces the cost of scientific "''!
discoveries and commercialization (Feldman, [30]). However, empirical evidence "'(!
suggests that these knowledge externalities are higher when firms are located in similar "')!
industries and geographically concentrated areas (Audretsch and Feldman, [19], Xu and "'*!
Sheng, [31]; Girma and Gong, [32]; Girma et al., [24]; Ivarsson and Alvstam, [33]; "(+!
Sjöholm and Lundin, [8]). "("!
Regarding the implications of ownership structure, Du et al. [34] highlighted the "(#!
extraordinarily heterogeneous ownership structure in China2 and argued that indigenous "($!
Chinese firms of different ownership behaved differently with respect to imitation, "(%!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 See Figure 1. 
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!
innovation and competition, and displayed different technological capabilities for "(&!
knowledge absorption from the presence of foreign firms. Jefferson et al. [35] found "('!
that ownership diversification during the period 1994-1999 led to the emergence of "((!
high-intensity R&D performers that exhibited substantial innovation capabilities. They "()!
further argued that foreign, private, and share-holding enterprises are the ones that made "(*!
the greatest innovation efforts in China. In similar terms, Girma et al. [42] concluded ")+!
that private and collectively-owned firms with foreign capital participation tended to ")"!
innovate more than other types of ownership. In the case of energy sector in China, ")#!
Fisher-Vanden et al. [3] found that ownership reform in the enterprise sector is one of ")$!
the principal drivers of China’s declining energy intensity. Their results found that ")%!
foreign-invested firms were consistently more energy-efficient than their state-owned ")&!
counterparts. Sinton and Fridley [36] concluded that the shift from state-owned to ")'!
collective, private, and foreign-invested ownership has played an important role in ")(!
improving energy efficiency in China since 1996. Recently, Herrerias et al. [12] pointed "))!
out that both foreign and non-state investments had played a leading role in the decline ")*!
of energy intensity across 28 Chinese regions, whereas no evidence of a positive "*+!
contribution of the state investment was identified. However, that work ignores "*"!
indigenous innovation and the different types of investment ownership that operate "*#!
through the transmission grids. This paper fills this gap in the relevant literature. "*$!
3. Data and Methodology "*%!
3.1 Data "*&!
This paper investigates the role played by both foreign and indigenous innovation as "*'!
key mechanisms to reduce energy intensity as well as the structure of investment "*(!
ownership in China over the period of 2006-2010. In doing so, the foreign technology is "*)!
measured by foreign direct investment and imports, while indigenous innovations are "**!
*!
!
captured by patents. In addition, we disaggregate total investment in fixed assets into #++!
state-owned, collectively-owned, cooperative, joint-venture, limited liability, share-#+"!
holding, private, self-employed, and foreign investment, which are measured as #+#!
percentages of GDP. This disaggregation provides a complete picture of this #+$!
phenomenon and its relevance to the study of energy intensity across 30 Chinese #+%!
regions. FDI, imports3 and the number of patents have been included to separate the #+&!
effect of foreign innovation from that of domestic innovation. Patents can be regarded #+'!
as a good reflection of indigenous innovation efforts as they usually contain #+(!
technological improvements and/or innovative ideas that at least have to be new in the #+)!
country. Therefore, these variables are associated with the aforementioned technique #+*!
effect. We investigate not only total energy intensity (Total energy consumption/GDP), #"+!
but also other relevant sources of energy such as coal, electricity, petroleum, and natural #""!
gas. These too are expressed in intensities.  #"#!
To provide robust estimates, other control variables such as the share of industry4 #"$!
(expressed as share of GDP) and energy prices (electricity and oil prices) are also #"%!
included.!The share of industry is related to the composition effect, while an increase in #"&!
energy prices is an additional factor that may reduce energy intensity (Zhao et al., [37]; #"'!
Wu, [38]). Since the progressive liberalization of the pricing system, the increase in #"(!
energy prices has led to a reduction in energy consumption, thereby improving the #")!
energy intensity ratio (Fisher-Vanden et al., [3]; Herrerias et al., [12]). In the case of the #"*!
Chinese economy, information about energy prices is rather limited. To overcome this ##+!
problem, we use electricity price for total energy, coal, and natural gas intensity, while ##"!
oil price is used for oil intensity. We are aware of the drawbacks of this procedure but, ###!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 We have introduced imports into the analysis since, on average, capital goods represented around 
70% of the overall imports over the period 1962-2004. See Herrerias and Orts [7]. 
4 Given the lack of data, we cannot disaggregate this variable in greater detail at the provincial level 
in China. 
"+!
!
at the moment, it is the only information available in the Chinese statistics. The source ##$!
of data is from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS).5 ##%!
As been mentioned above, taking the Chinese regional dimension into account is ##&!
essential. In this paper, we employ two different approaches to deal with regional ##'!
heterogeneity. The first is based on the inclusion of a set of dummy variables in the case ##(!
of those provinces that belong to each of the six transmission grids that exist in China ##)!
(see Figure 3). We then make an interaction effect of this dummy variable with each of ##*!
the ownership structure considered in this work. This allows us to investigate the #$+!
differential effect by type of ownership across different transmission grids. The second #$"!
approach to overcome the heterogeneity of the Chinese provinces is to estimate the #$#!
model allowing for heteroskedasticity. #$$!
Tables 1 and 2 provide a summary of statistics of investment ownership and energy #$%!
intensity variables. From there, we can observe that state-ownership predominates over #$&!
other types of investment, even in a period that is characterized by a process of #$'!
liberalization. The period (2006-2010) was not chosen at random, but rather it attempts #$(!
to capture the period of time when most of the reforms took place. Moreover, since #$)!
2006 Chinese statistics offer a more detailed view of this investment structure, with #$*!
improved information coming from the NBS. Prior to 2006, part of the investment was #%+!
classified as “other types of investment”, without knowing what type of investment it #%"!
belonged to. With this change, we have a clearer picture of each type of investment #%#!
ownership. In fact, there is a growing trend for domestic investment to take the form of #%$!
private and limited liability (10.3% and 15.1% respectively on average for the period #%%!
under consideration), and also share-holding investment reaches 27.9% in some regions, #%&!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 See Data Appendix for a detailed description of each variable. 
""!
!
even though on average it represents only 4% of the ownership.6 This is not unusual, #%'!
given the aforementioned heterogeneity, as shown in Figure 1 (a-i). It plots each type of #%(!
investment ownership on a map of the Chinese regions in 2010. Table 2 shows #%)!
information about energy intensity for both total and each source of energy considered. #%*!
We can see that oil displays the highest percentage (16.4%), and it is relatively close to #&+!
the more traditional sources of energy used by China, like coal and electricity (14.1% #&"!
and 13.7%). #&#!
3.2. Methodology #&$!
Panel data methods were applied in order to consider the heterogeneity of Chinese #&%!
regions over time. Within the battery of estimators available, we selected the one #&&!
proposed by Beck and Katz [39], the so-called panel-corrected standard errors. The #&'!
attractiveness of this approach, according to these authors, is that common techniques #&(!
applied to time-series cross-section (TSCS) data produce incorrect results, in particular #&)!
with regard to the accuracy of the standard errors. #&*!
It is well-known that OLS becomes problematic in panel data techniques, when one #'+!
or more Markov assumptions are not satisfied. In the presence of temporal and spatial #'"!
correlation in the error term as well as heteroskedasticity, Parks [40] proposed a method #'#!
to deal with these problems based on GLS. However, the use of this method can lead to #'$!
dramatic underestimates of parameter variability in common research due to the #'%!
assumptions made about the structure of the error term, such as it is known. The #'&!
alternative often used by researchers is to apply the Feasible Generalized Least Squares #''!
(FGLS), which relaxes the assumption of the known errors structure and uses estimates #'(!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Another reason for considering this time period for the analysis is the fact that we aim to investigate 
the effect of both foreign and indigenous technology on energy intensity. However, the latter has 
become relevant since the People’s Party Congress in 2006, where the focus of the Five-Year Plan 
relied on technology development. The ambition was to make the People’s Republic of China an 
innovation-driven economy. We are aware of the short sample for the analysis, and therefore results 
should be interpreted with caution. 
"#!
!
of the error process. However, when there are a large number of parameters to estimate, #')!
FGLS causes estimates of the standard errors of the estimated coefficients to understate #'*!
their true variability by between 50% and 300%, according to Monte Carlo simulations #(+!
(Beck and Katz, [39]). To solve the apparent problem, Beck and Katz [39] suggested #("!
correcting the formula for the sampling variability of the OLS estimates, which is given #(#!
by the square roots of the diagonal term. #($!
Thus, the standard formulation of TSCS models under the assumption of poolability #(%!
is as follows:7 #(&! !"# $ %"#& ' (" ' )# ' *"+,,,- $ ./012 3 $ .04     ( 1 ) #('! *"/# $ 5"*"/#67 ' 8"/#          ( 2 ) #((!
where %"# is a vector of k exogenous variables, and observations are indexed both by #()!
unit ( i ) and by time ( t ).8 !"# denotes the vector of observations on the dependent #(*!
variable, ( and ) are individual and time effects respectively and 8"/# are variables that #)+!
are independently distributed over time. Thus, Parks’ method, which is based on FGLS, #)"!
takes into account panel heteroskedasticity and unit-specific serial correlation (5"9. #)#!
4 Results #)$!
In Table 3, we present the results for each type of investment ownership as well as #)%!
for imported technology, and their effects on energy intensity for both total energy and #)&!
the different sources of energy considered in this work. In Table 4, besides the structure #)'!
of investment, we also account for the effect of indigenous innovation. Tables 5 and 6 #)(!
present the results of the relationship between foreign and indigenous innovation on #))!
energy intensity. Finally, Table 7 shows a summary of the results coming from the #)*!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7  Given the small sample in our data, the issue of heterogeneity in the beta coefficient is not 
considered. In addition and for the same reason, we only contemplate the static version of the panel 
data. 
!"We tested for endogeneity in all our estimated models. However, we did not find any symptoms of 
this problem, thereby making the application of instrumental variables unnecessary. Furthermore, 
due to the small sample and unbalanced panel, panel cointegration techniques were not applied. This 
method requires a longer period to obtain robust estimates."
"$!
!
spatial dimension.9 The first four columns of these tables report the results for “Total #*+!
Energy Intensity”, while the others show the findings for “Coal”, “Electricity”, “Gas”, #*"!
and “Oil” intensity. #*#!
Recall that the technique effect is captured by both foreign and indigenous #*$!
innovation. The foreign technology is comprised with FDI and imports, while #*%!
indigenous innovations are represented by patents. According to our results (Table 3 #*&!
and 4), both foreign and indigenous technology matter in the process of energy #*'!
efficiency improvement. However, this effect could be influenced by the source of #*(!
energy under consideration in the case of foreign technology. On the one hand, our #*)!
findings show that foreign investment10 could reduce total energy intensity and coal #**!
intensity. This is explained by the fact that China is coal dependent and also because the $++!
coal industry was among the first energy sectors opened up for foreign entry with the $+"!
aim of bringing in advanced expertise and technology. On the other hand, imports $+#!
improve total energy efficiency in China as well as for the electricity sector. The $+$!
knowledge transfer through openness seems to play an important role in this industry. In $+%!
addition, the electric power cuts in the majority of regions during the summer period, $+&!
and the need to import energy from abroad, can partially explain these results. $+'!
The effect of indigenous innovation is reported in Table 4. As can be observed, $+(!
patents are always significant and with a negative sign.11 These findings indicate that $+)!
compared with technology transfer via FDI and imports, domestic innovation seems to $+*!
play a more significant role in the diffusion of energy-saving technologies. This is $"+!
consistent with the finding of Fu and Gong [20] that indigenous technology may result $""!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
*!Appendix A reports the complete statistical results for each type of investment ownership. 
"+!We are aware that other types of ownership might contain some foreign participation Jointly with 
the domestic one. However, we are not able to distinguish the percentage of foreign participation 
due the lack of data. Thus, for the sake of simplicity we attribute the technique effect to foreign 
investment and imports. 
""!We have to keep in mind that most of the patents still come from the state sector (see Fu and Gong, 
2011; Li, 2011).!
"%!
!
in higher efficiency gains in certain sectors. Li [22] further argues that to use foreign $"#!
technology better, China should enhance its absorptive capacity through its own R&D $"$!
activities. $"%!
An interesting hypothesis to be tested is the relationship between foreign and $"&!
indigenous technology, and energy intensity. In doing so, we define an interaction effect $"'!
that is the product of foreign direct investment and patents (Table 5), and then we define $"(!
another one that is the product of imports and patents (Table 6). This empirical strategy $")!
allows us to distinguish the two components of our foreign technical effects and their $"*!
relation with indigenous innovation. Our results show that the combination of foreign $#+!
and domestic technology as drivers of energy-saving measures only matters with regard $#"!
to total and coal intensity. By contrast, it seems that foreign and indigenous innovations $##!
have a crowding-out effect on oil energy intensity. The limited impact of the interaction $#$!
between foreign and domestic technology in China is also found in Sjöholm and Lundin, $#%!
[8]. One of the possible explanations for this outcome is the long adaption process of $#&!
foreign technology by domestic firms and the lack of coordination among the different $#'!
stakeholders (Karplus, [42]). In addition, as previously mentioned, the spillovers can $#(!
have certain effect within the same industry or region, but no effect across regions. $#)!
As can be observed in Tables 3 and 4, when it comes to explain the evolution of $#*!
energy intensity across Chinese regions, the type of investment ownership matters. $$+!
Empirical results from Tables 3 and 4 show that state investment does not seem to help $$"!
in the reduction of energy intensity in any case since, as whenever significant, it shows $$#!
a positive sign. This effect is more evident among the Northern and Central provinces in $$$!
China in the case of coal and electricity intensity (Table 7). These results are similar to $$%!
the ones obtained by Sinton and Fridley [36] and Herrerias et al. [12] for China. These $$&!
studies confirm that a shift from state-owned investment plays a key role in improving $$'!
"&!
!
energy efficiency in this country. Among non-state investments, there are notable $$(!
differences for each type of investment, geographical transmission grid and source of $$)!
energy. We find that both self-employed and foreign investments12 are beneficial to $$*!
improve total energy efficiency (Tables 3 and 4).  However, only the latter shows a $%+!
significant effect in the East, North and South of China (Table 7). In the case of coal, in $%"!
addition to foreign investment, share-holding investment is also found to play a $%#!
significant role in reducing coal intensity, especially in the Southern provinces (Table $%$!
7). The role played by share-holding investment on coal intensity is robust to different $%%!
specifications (Table 4) and can be explained by! its significant participation in this $%&!
industry. For electricity intensity, we find that only private investment has a significant $%'!
negative influence. Once the economic geography is taken into account, we observe that $%(!
this phenomenon is concentrated in the North-East of China (Table 7). This result can $%)!
be explained by the dominant presence of the state sector in the electricity market. In the $%*!
case of gas and oil intensity, cooperative, self-employed, joint-ventures, and private $&+!
investments are useful conduits for the improvement of gas efficiency resources (Tables $&"!
3 and 4). Cooperative investment has a major impact in the North-East of China, while $&#!
self-employed, joint-ventures and private investments seem to be more significant in the $&$!
North-East, East and South of China (Table 7). However, in the case of oil intensity, $&%!
cooperative investment appears to be significant in Central regions, while the effects for $&&!
self-employed, joint-ventures and private investments predominate more in the North, $&'!
Central and South, except in private investments that are also relevant in the Eastern $&(!
area. $&)!
These results could be explained by the fact that the National Development and $&*!
Reform Commission (NDRC) is making all-out efforts to encourage private investment $'+!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Kumar [15] and Sahu and Narayama [17] for India and Fisher-Vanden et al. [3][4] for China 
confirm that foreign companies are more efficient in the use of energy resources than their domestic 
counterparts. 
"'!
!
in more heavily state-controlled and monopolized sectors, such as electricity, oil, and $'"!
natural gas, in order to make the economy more dynamic and to reduce the presence of $'#!
the state sector. Moreover, in recent years, the Chinese government has invited foreign $'$!
joint-ventures to bid for shale gas exploration licenses to develop China’s potential $'%!
reserves and to mitigate its dependence on imported coal and oil. Relatively recent $'&!
infrastructure projects like the West-East Electricity Transfer Project that aims to $''!
increase the generation capacity in Northern and Central provinces and the “West-to-$'(!
East Gas Transmission Pipe Line” in the Southern and Eastern areas would help to $')!
improve the efficiency of energy resources. This strategy can allow China to become $'*!
more self-sufficient in energy. $(+!
The above-mentioned results give support to the so-called technical effect, and $("!
highlight the importance of the reforms in the structure of investment ownership as well $(#!
as the need to strength both domestic and foreign innovation in order to improve energy $($!
efficiency in China. In all the specifications, the composition effect, captured by the $(%!
share of the secondary sector over GDP, shows the expected sign, namely, in all the $(&!
cases where it is significant, industry has a positive sign, except in gas intensity. This $('!
result indicates that further improvements in energy intensity can be achieved through $((!
sectoral decomposition, for example by shifting toward less energy-intensive sectors. $()!
The Chinese economy depends on industrial performance which consumes a significant $(*!
amount of coal. The increasing relevance of the service sector is a challenge to balance $)+!
the economy for the sustainability of regional growth and a better use of energy $)"!
resources.  $)#!
Finally, Chinese energy prices are found to be an additional source of improvement $)$!
in the use of energy resources per unit of output across regions in the case of total $)%!
energy intensity, gas, and coal intensity when imports are included in the model as a $)&!
"(!
!
source of technological transfer (Table 3), and total energy intensity and coal intensity $)'!
when domestic innovations are considered (Table 4). However, we found that in oil $)(!
intensity, oil prices are not significant (Tables 3 and 4) and in electricity intensity its $))!
price has a positive sign. These unexpected findings might indicate that a liberalization $)*!
of energy prices in China could improve energy efficiency, and therefore further $*+!
reforms are required in this sector.13 $*"!
4. Conclusions $*#!
Suitable policies for the improvement of energy efficiency in China have received $*$!
considerable attention among economists and policy-makers owing to their significant $*%!
implications for climate change and environmental protection. Changes in energy $*&!
intensity can be attributed to both technological progress and industrial composition. $*'!
However, a limited number of studies have identified the precise channels through $*(!
which these effects may operate.  $*)!
In this paper, we argue that both indigenous and foreign innovations play an $**!
important role in the diffusion of knowledge spillovers with an energy-reducing effect %++!
in this country. However, this externality may vary depending on both of the structure %+"!
of the investment as well as its geographical location. Our findings corroborate the %+#!
importance of accounting for these two factors when analyzing the dynamics of energy %+$!
intensity in China. The fact that geography matters in the process of transmission of %+%!
knowledge is not surprising due to the high level of heterogeneity in the regional %+&!
distribution of economic activity and the uneven distribution of the different types of %+'!
firms across China. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to address this %+(!
question.  %+)!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 See Herrerias et al. [12], where it is found that international crude oil price is an additional factor in 
reducing energy intensity with different specifications. 
")!
!
Our empirical analysis is performed across 30 Chinese regions over the period of %+*!
2006-2010 by using panel data techniques. The results obtained suggest, on one hand, %"+!
that both domestic and foreign technology play an important role in improving the use %""!
of energy resources. However, the former seems to play a leading role in such process. %"#!
In addition, the interaction between foreign and domestic technology to improve energy %"$!
efficiency is quiet modest, indicating the need to promote not only both foreign and %"%!
indigenous technology, but also to create the mechanisms in domestic firms that can %"&!
facilitate the assimilation and implementation of foreign technology in their production %"'!
process. On the other hand, our estimates indicate that the specific type of investment %"(!
ownership matters when it comes to explain the reduction in energy intensity. We find %")!
that state investment plays a minor role in reducing any source of energy intensity in %"*!
China. Non-state investment is, by far, a more important element. More specifically, we %#+!
find that private investment plays an important role in this process in all sources of %#"!
energy except in coal intensity. Cooperative and joint-ventures seem to be significant in %##!
reducing gas and oil intensity, while share-holding investment reduces mainly coal %#$!
intensity. Foreign investment seems to be relevant for total and coal energy intensity. %#%!
However, once we consider the regional heterogeneity and we estimate the differential %#&!
effect of investment ownership, we observe that most of the non-state investment has %#'!
greater effects in the Eastern and Southern provinces when compared with the Central %#(!
and Western ones. For the vast North and Western regions, limited progress has been %#)!
made in improving all sources of energy efficiency among various ownership structures. %#*!
This is partially because of the state’s dominant position in these regions and partially %$+!
because of their relatively affluent reserves of resources. Hence, according to our %$"!
results, what matters in reducing energy intensity is not only the type of investment %$#!
ownership, but also its geographical location. %$$!
"*!
!
Finally, the share of industry (which captures the composition effect) is mainly %$%!
positive, thereby indicating that there is much room for improvement in the use of %$&!
energy resources by promoting changes in the sectorial composition. We also find that, %$'!
in most of the cases, increases in energy prices reduce energy intensity. %$(!
To sum up, energy policies that aim to promote foreign and domestic innovations as %$)!
well as an increase in the presence of the non-state sector across the Chinese provinces %$*!
may improve energy efficiency, thereby contributing to environmental protection both %%+!
in China and worldwide. %%"!
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Data Appendix &&#!
GDP: Gross Regional Product (100 Million Yuan). This refers to the final products &&$!
at market prices produced by all resident units within a country (or a region) over a &&%!
certain period of time. &&&!
Industry: Secondary Industry/GDP. This refers to mining and quarrying, &&'!
manufacturing, production and supply of electricity, water and gas, and construction. &&(!
Energy Intensity Total: This refers to the total energy consumption in each region &&)!
divided by GDP. &&*!
Energy Intensity Coal: This refers to coal consumption divided by GDP. &'+!
Energy Intensity Electricity: This refers to electricity consumption divided by &'"!
GDP. &'#!
Energy Intensity Petroleum: This refers to oil consumption divided by GDP. &'$!
Energy Intensity Natural Gas: This refers to natural gas consumption divided by &'%!
GDP. &'&!
Patent (Number of Applications Accepted and Granted): This is an abbreviation &''!
for the patent right and refers to the exclusive right of ownership by the inventors or &'(!
designers of the creation or inventions, which is issued by the patents office after the &')!
due process of assessment and approval in accordance with Patent Law. Patents are &'*!
granted for inventions, utility models, and designs. This indicator reflects the &(+!
achievements of S&T and design with independent intellectual property. &("!
Imports (IMP/GDP): This refers to the real value of commodities imported across &(#!
the borders of China. They include the actual imports through foreign trade, goods &($!
imported for the processing and assembly trades, and materials, supplies and gifts as aid &(%!
given gratis between both governments and the United Nations and other international &(&!
organizations, as well as contributions donated by overseas Chinese, compatriots in &('!
Hong Kong and Macao and Chinese with foreign citizenship, leasing commodities &((!
owned by tenants on expiry of the leasing period, imported commodities processed with &()!
imported materials, commodities trading in border areas (excluding mutual exchange &(*!
goods), the imported commodities and articles for public use of the Sino-foreign Joint &)+!
ventures, cooperative enterprises, and ventures with sole foreign investment. The &)"!
indicator of the total imports at customs can be used to observe the total size of external &)#!
trade in a country. In accordance with the stipulation of the Chinese government, &)$!
imports are calculated CIF. We divided imports by GDP. &)%!
Price: We use electricity price (for Industry 35kV and above, RMB/KWH) and Oil &)&!
price (RMB/Ton), which is the only information available. In the case of total energy &)'!
consumption, coal consumption, and natural gas, we use electricity price as a proxy &)(!
variable. &))!
 &)*!
Investment Ownership: (Investment ownership / GDP)  &*+!
State-owned: This refers to non-corporation economic units where the entire assets &*"!
are owned by the State and which have registered in accordance with the Regulation of &*#!
the People's Republic of China on the Management of Registration of Corporate &*$!
#&!
!
Enterprises. Excluded from this category are sole state-funded corporations in the &*%!
limited liability corporations. &*&!
Collective-owned: This refers to economic units where the assets are owned &*'!
collectively, and which have registered in accordance with the Regulation of the &*(!
People's Republic of China on the Management of Registration of Corporate &*)!
Enterprises. &**!
Cooperative: This refers to a form of collective economic units (enterprises) where '++!
capitals come mainly from employees as their shares, with a certain proportion of '+"!
capital from the outside, where production is organized on the basis of independent '+#!
operation, independent accounting for profits and losses, Joint work, democratic '+$!
management, and a distribution system that integrates remuneration according to work '+%!
with a dividend according to capital share. '+&!
Joint-Venture: This refers to economic units established by two or more corporate '+'!
enterprises or corporate institutions of the same or different ownership, through Joint '+(!
investment on the basis of equality, voluntary participation, and mutual benefits. They '+)!
include state Joint-ownership enterprises, collective Joint-ownership enterprises, Joint '+*!
state-collective enterprises, and other Joint-ownership enterprises. '"+!
Limited Liability: This refers to economic units established with investment from 2-'""!
50 investors and registered in accordance with the Regulation of the People's Republic '"#!
of China on the Management of Registration of Corporations, each investor bearing '"$!
limited liability to the corporation depending on its share of investment, and the '"%!
corporation bearing liability to its debt to the maximum of its total assets. Limited '"&!
liability corporations include exclusive state-funded limited liability corporations and '"'!
other limited liability corporations. '"(!
Share-holding: This refers to economic units registered in accordance with the '")!
Regulation of the People's Republic of China on the Management of Registration of '"*!
Corporations, with total registered capitals divided into equal shares and raised through '#+!
issuing stocks. Each investor bears limited liability to the corporation depending on the '#"!
holding of shares, and the corporation bears liability to its debt to the maximum of its '##!
total assets. '#$!
Private: This refers to profit-making economic units invested and established by '#%!
natural persons, or controlled by natural persons using employed labor. Included in this '#&!
category are private limited liability corporations, private share-holding corporations '#'!
Ltd., private partnership enterprises, and private-funded enterprises registered in '#(!
accordance with the Corporation Law, Partnership Enterprises Law, and Interim '#)!
Regulations on Private Enterprises. '#*!
Self-employed Individual: This refers to domestic-funded economic individuals '$+!
other than those mentioned above. '$"!
Foreign Funded: This refers to enterprises established in the mainland of China '$#!
with exclusive investment from foreign investors in accordance with the Law of the '$$!
People's Republic of China on Foreign-Funded Enterprises and other relevant laws. '$%!
 '$&!
Source: All definitions come from the National Bureau of Statistics of China in their '$'!
original form.  '$(!
#'!
!
List of Tables '$)!
 '$*!
Table 1: Summary of Statistics, Investment Ownership / GDP. (2006-2010) '%+!
Variable  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
State 150 0.193 0.077 0.064 0.409 
Collective 150 0.015 0.013 0.000 0.061 
Cooperative 150 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.010 
Joint 150 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.010 
Limited 150 0.151 0.057 0.056 0.334 
Share-holding 150 0.044 0.023 0.009 0.145 
Private 150 0.103 0.057 0.017 0.279 
Self-employed 150 0.025 0.012 0.000 0.067 
Foreign  150 0.020 0.014 0.003 0.058 
 '%"!
Table 2: Summary of Statistics, Energy Consumption / GDP (2006-2010) '%#!
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total Energy 120 0.134 0.064 0.054 0.398 
Coal Energy 120 0.141 0.110 0.022 0.602 
Electricity Energy 120 0.137 0.082 0.062 0.532 
Oil Energy 112 0.164 0.160 0.000 0.667 
Natural Gas Energy 120 0.005 0.006 0.000 0.023 
 '%$!
Table 3: Investment Ownership, imported technology, and energy intensity '%%!
  '%&!
  Total Coal Electricity Gas Oil 
State 0.3550*** 0.9030 0.1780* 0.0052 -0.1040 
Collective 0.4374 0.4227 0.3440 0.0518 0.1550 
Cooperative 0.2131 0.6070** 0.3917* -0.2750* -0.7700** 
Joint 0.1938 0.8604** 0.9180 -0.1920* -0.1449*** 
Limited 0.5850 0.5366*** 0.0941 0.0172 0.2420 
Share-holding 0.2435* -0.6232*** 0.3140 0.1050*** 0.3872*** 
Private -0.1797** -0.1010 -0.3050*** -0.0374*** -0.1192*** 
Self-employed -0.6551*** -0.1084 -0.3520 -0.0495 -0.1825** 
Foreign -0.6905** -0.1902*** 0.0175 0.0174 0.2285 
Industry 0.2223*** 0.4814*** 0.3190*** -0.0165* 0.1810 
Imports -0.3650*** -0.1580 -0.0314* -0.0002 0.0769 
Electricity Price -0.8650*** -0.3025*** 0.0279** -0.0068** 
Oil Price 
    
-0.0605 
No observations 120 120 120 120 112 
R2 0.9592 0.9287 0.9646 0.8493 0.8843 
Individual Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: * p!<!.10, **p!<!.05, *** p!<!.01 
 
#(!
!
Table 4: Investment Ownership, domestic innovation, and energy intensity '%'!
  Total Coal Electricity Gas Oil 
State 0.2812*** 0.7460 0.2140** 0.0144** -0.1540 
Collective 0.3861 0.5747 0.3030 0.0192 0.1130 
Cooperative 0.1976 0.4914** 0.5121*** -0.3140** -0.8483** 
Joint 0.1315 0.7926** 0.0063 -0.0975 -0.1289*** 
Limited 0.2570 0.4847*** -0.0175 0.0036 -0.0066 
Share-holding 0.2680 -0.5945** 0.0919 0.0899*** 0.3601*** 
Private -0.9180 -0.0782 -0.1630 -0.0259** -0.1031*** 
Self-Employed -0.5491** -0.1317 -0.4040 -0.0933** -0.1893** 
Foreign -0.7527** -0.1756*** 0.0808 0.0441 0.3314** 
Industry 0.3522*** 0.5479*** 0.4160*** -0.0104 0.2200 
Patents -0.1560*** -0.1010* -0.0207*** -0.0020*** -0.0302** 
Electricity 
Price -0.7070*** -0.2603*** 0.0456 -0.0032 
Oil Price 
    
0.0079 
No 
Observations 120 120 120 120 112 
R2 0.9751 0.9292 0.9699 0.8516 0.8865 
Individual 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: * p!<!.10, **p!<!.05, *** p!<!.01 
 '%(!
Table 5: Relationship between FDI and domestic Innovation '%)!
Total Coal Electricity Gas Oil 
State 0.2014*** 0.431 0.217** 0.0088 0.184 
Collective 0.5015** 0.6807 0.307 0.0538* -0.297 
Cooperative 0.2181 0.4922** 0.4990*** -0.282** -0.8968** 
Joint 0.9648 0.7643** -0.0283 -0.135 -0.1534*** 
Limited 0.1523** 0.4878*** -0.0272 0.0016 -0.396* 
Share-holding 0.469 -0.5352** 0.0875 0.0802*** 0.3355*** 
Private -0.2052*** -0.882 -0.154 -0.0261** -0.698** 
Self-Employed -0.3401 0.587 -0.417 -0.0712* -0.3576*** 
Foreign -0.5420*** -0.3219 0.47 -0.251 0.2468*** 
Industry 0.2636*** 0.5062*** 0.414*** -0.0088 0.311* 
Patents -0.238*** -0.13 -0.0203*** -0.0031*** 0.0245 
Electricity Price -0.772*** -0.2552*** 0.0447 -0.0034 
 Foreign x Patents 0.4982*** 0.1636 -0.0401 0.0316 -0.2276*** 
Oil Price 
    
-0.0884 
No Observations 120 120 120 120 112 
R2 0.9614 0.9359 0.9698 0.8629 0.9076 
Individual Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note:  * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 '%*!
 '&+!
#)!
!
Table 6: Relationship between Imports and Domestic Innovation '&"!
Total Coal Electricity Gas Oil 
State 0.1780*** 0.355 0.219** 0.0114* 0.163 
Collective 0.7338*** 0.7473 0.322 0.0309 -0.999 
Cooperative 0.2378 0.3963 0.4858*** -0.272** -0.6500** 
Joint 0.1387 0.8394** 0.132 -0.127 -0.1373*** 
Limited 0.1438** 0.5273*** -0.0245 0.0029 -0.108 
Share-Holding 0.0873 -0.6934*** 0.0831 0.0910*** 0.2911*** 
Private -0.1530** -0.476 -0.175 -0.0249** -0.633 
Self-Employed -0.3452 -0.554 -0.403 -0.0740* -0.3059*** 
Foreign -0.3011 -0.1418** 0.137 0.0050 0.1023 
Imports -0.4949*** -0.4279*** -0.109 0.0243 0.1922** 
Industry 0.2144*** 0.4545*** 0.417*** -0.0062 0.481*** 
Patents -0.268*** -0.225*** -0.0215*** -0.0013 0.0079 
Electricity Price -0.770*** -0.2689*** 0.0506* -0.0045 
 Imports x Patents 0.467*** 0.408*** 0.0096 -0.0021 -0.183** 
Oil Price 
    
-0.0817 
No Observations 120 120 120 120 112 
R2 0.9681 0.9346 0.9703 0.8562 0.8987 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 '&#!
Table 7: Summary of the Results, Investment Ownership and Regional Dimension '&$!
  Total Coal Electricity Gas  Oil 
State North, Central, North-Western (+) 
North-East, North, 
East, Central, 
South, North-
Western (+) 
North-East (-); 
North, North-
Western (+) 
North, East (-) Central, South, North-Western (-) 
Collective South (-) North-East, North, North-Western (+) North (+) North-East, North (-) South (-) 
Cooperative East, South (-); North-Western (+) 
North-East, North, 
North-Western (+) 
North, North-
Western (+); East 
(-) 
North-East, North, East 
(-) Central (-) 
Joint- venture 
North-East, South 
(-); North, North-
Western (+) 
North, North-
Western (+); 
South (-) 
North-East, East, 
Central, South (-) 
North-East, North, 
South (-); North-
Western (+) 
North, Central, 
South (-) 
Limited Liability  North (+) 
North-East (-); 
North, North-
Western (+) 
North (-) North, East, Central (-) 
Share-Holding South (-) South (-) 
North-East (-); 
North, North-
Western (+) 
East (-); Central, South, 
North-Western (+) 
North-East, North-
Western (+) 
Private  South (-) 
North-East (-); 
North-Western 
(+) 
North-East, South (-); 
Central (+) 
North, East, 
Central, South (-) 
Self- Employed North, Central, North-Western (+) 
North-East, North, 
North-Western (+) 
North, North-
Western (+) 
North-East, North, East, 
South (-); North-
Western (+) 
North-East, North-
Western  (+); East, 
Central, South (-) 
Foreign 
North, East, South 
(-); North-Western 
(+) 
East, Central, 
South (-) 
North-Western 
(+)  
Central (-); South, 
North-Western (+) 
Note: We include in the table those results, which are robust to different specifications. A complete statistical analysis '&%!
is available upon request by the authors. The sign of the effects appears in brackets.  '&&!
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Figure 1: Map of Chinese regions, Investment Ownership / GDP in 2010 '&)!
 '&*!
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!Figure 2: Map of the Transmission Grid 
"
Source: Herrerias et al. (2013a) 
 
Grid 1: North-East = 1 for Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning and Inner Mongolia; 
                 0 otherwise 
Grid 2: North = 1 for Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi and Shandong; 
         0 otherwise 
Grid 3: East = 1 for Shanghai, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangsu and Fujian; 
                   0 otherwise 
Grid 4: Central = 1 for Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Chongqing and Sichuan; 
           0 otherwise  
Grid 5: South = 1 for Guangdong, Hainan, Guangxi, Yunnan and Guizhou; 
         0 otherwise 
Grid 6: North-Western = 1 for Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang; 
            0 otherwise 
 
